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Key Points
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issues.i Critics and supporters of ISDS alike have, not
surprisingly, highlighted differing decisions as an issue
(or symptom of a problem) in the current ISDS system
that needs to be addressed. Because of this legal
uncertainty, both regulatory conduct by states and
investment decisions by private sector actors may be
unduly chilled, and disputing parties must spend
unnecessary time and money litigating and relitigating
the same legal questions. Indeed, the only
“stakeholder” that arguably benefits from this
inconsistency is the arbitration industry.

interpretations and other areas of law and public
policy.
It is instructive to highlight that the European
Commission is also pursuing different reforms in order
to address the issue of inconsistency across different
areas of law and policy. Specifically, in light of the
issue of inconsistency between intra-EU investment
treaties and the law and principles of the EU, the
Commission is exploring how to support its Member
States in jointly terminating all intra-EU BITs and
excising those agreements’ survival clauses.iii

The issues regarding consistency fall into several
different, sometimes overlapping, categories: There is
the issue of divergent interpretations of the same
treaty; the issue of inconsistent interpretations of the
same or similar provisions across treaties; the issue of
arbitral decisions that are inconsistent with state party
intent; and the issue of arbitral decisions that are
inconsistent with broader societal objectives and
commitments, including the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), international treaty commitments, or
other areas of domestic or international law. Each of
these types of inconsistency merits attention and
consideration of appropriate reforms. It may be that
some types of reform might reduce one aspect of
inconsistency but expand the others.

In order to more fully explore these issues of
inconsistency and relevant reform options, we can use
one particular example of inconsistency – a dispute in
which two different tribunals heard claims arising out of
the very same facts and domestic measures but came
to opposite conclusions about whether the state was
liable and had to pay. The relevant example comes
from TECO v. Guatemalaiv and Iberdrola v.
Guatemala.v In these disputes, two different foreign
shareholders in one Guatemalan electricity distribution
company, Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala (EEGSA),
brought two different ISDS suits to challenge the same
government conduct. When Guatemala’s electricity
regulator decided not to grant EEGSA its requested
tariff increases, the two corporate investors used
treaty-based ISDS to sue the government. The
tribunals in those two cases came to opposite
conclusions on what the treaties mean and do.
Exacerbating the confusion arising from those
diverging decisions, each tribunal award was subject
to requests for annulment, with the different annulment
committees (and their members) coming to different
conclusions about the merits of the underlying
decisions, and the committees’ power to review those
decisions. Using this particular example of
inconsistency, we can further explore the nature of the
different inconsistency problems, and the promise and
peril of different reform solutions.

One proposal put forward to resolve an aspect of the
inconsistency issue is to create an investment court.
The European Commission has said, for instance, that
a key benefit of a court as opposed to the present ad
hoc system of investment arbitration is that it will result
in more consistent and predictable decisions.ii Another
proposal is to create an appellate body, which would
review decisions by the proposed investment court
and/or arbitration tribunals. The proposals envision
that these new bodies, the court and/or appellate body,
would steer the law more uniformly in one direction or
another.
These reform proposals might indeed improve
consistency of decisions arising out of specific treaties
or, more complicated and controversially, could
improve consistency of decisions across treaties. But
they do not necessarily tackle, and may even
exacerbate, the other key issues at the heart of these
diverging decisions, which relate to the question of
consistency between, on the one hand, what
arbitrators say the treaties mean and, on the other,
what states consider that investment protection
means, as well as consistency between treaty

2. The Context
In the mid-1990s, Guatemala was beginning to come
out of a thirty-year civil war. After concluding a peace
agreement to halt the conflict in 1996, the healing
country took various steps to improve its citizens’ lives
and livelihoods, including by improving access to and
quality of public services and infrastructure. In order to
advance those social objectives, Guatemala adopted
regulatory reforms to privatize and attract investment
2

in its energy sector (generation, transmission, and
distribution). This shift toward privatization, reflected in
a new regulatory framework, aimed to promote
competition, ensure rates were based on costs, and
also improve quality and availability of energy services.

renewable sources, and “is more expensive given the
volatility of international prices for fossil fuels.”xii
Furthermore, as UNCTAD also noted, the consumer
subsidies provided by the government to help ensure
access to affordable electricity under the investorfriendly legal framework reduced the resources
available to the government to further invest in
expanding its renewable energy supply.xiii

The legal framework that was erected to promote
private investment – including the General Electricity
Law that came into effect in 1998 and individual
power-purchase agreements (PPAs) negotiated with
energy generators – offered “favourable conditions”
and “generous fiscal incentives” to investors, and were
successful in attracting significant attention from
foreign companies. Indeed, in the roughly 10 years
following privatization, foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the electricity sector amounted to over USD 1.5
billion.vi

3. Guatemala’s Tariff Dispute
Under the legal framework Guatemala adopted in the
late 1990s to govern its reformed energy sector,
electricity tariffs were to be reviewed every 5 years. In
the first five-year review under that legal framework,
covering 2003-2008, the government regulator (CNEE)
approved an increase in EEGSA’s tariff schedule
without dispute.

In 1998, a consortium of foreign investors, including
Iberdrola and TECO, purchased a majority stake in
EEGSA, one of Guatemala’s two state-owned energy
companies, responsible for providing power to
Guatemala’s central region, including its capital city.
TECO also invested in separate coal- and oil-fired
power generation facilities in Guatemala, selling the
power it generated to EEGSA.vii Private investment
brought “solid growth” in generating capacity that had
been “unmatched in Guatemala’s history.”viii Proceeds
from the sale of formerly state-owned assets were also
used to expand the network and connect the rural
population to electricity grids.

Things did not go so smoothly in the next review
process. Disputes arose regarding
•

•
•

But in other measures of success, the government’s
energy reforms were less positive.
•

In particular, due in part to the terms of the PPAs,
post-privatization electricity prices were unusually and
exceedingly high. As UNCTAD reported, by 2008,
average electricity rates to commercial and residential
end users were “the least competitive in the region.”ix
These rates, in turn, drove heavy government
subsidies to low-income consumers, and threatened
“the country’s competitiveness across all sectors.”x

the Terms of Reference governing the relevant
underlying study EEGSA was required to
prepare and submit to CNEE to be used in
developing the tariff schedule,
the content and conclusions of that study
submitted by EEGSA to CNEE, which would
have produced further tariff increases,
the process for resolving disagreements
regarding the study, including the role of an
“Expert Commission” in resolving disputes
between EEGSA and CNEE, and
whether CNEE could, as it did, contract for and
use a separate study should it determine that
EEGSA’s study did not meet legal
requirements.

Throughout the process and after CNEE issued its
pricing decision rejecting EEGSA’s requested
increases, these disagreements generated significant
litigation within Guatemala, with EEGSA raising its
concerns about Guatemala’s regulatory actions
through administrative and court proceedings. In some
phases, EEGSA prevailed but, ultimately, the
Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the regulator
CNEE on the different challenged aspects of the tariff
dispute. In two decisions rendered in November 2009
and February 2010, the Constitutional Court
determined that the regulator had acted appropriately
in commissioning and relying on its own tariff review
study (and rejecting the study that had been prepared

Notably, much of the new private foreign investment
was in installing fossil fuel-based rather than
renewable capacity. The new investment shifted the
country from one that primarily had relied upon
hydropower for energy sources to one that sourced
most of its energy from thermal plants.xi While such
fossil-fuel based power sources were attractive to
foreign firms as they “see faster returns to investment,”
the energy they generate is less climate-friendly than
3

and submitted by EEGSA’s consultants). The
Constitutional Court also determined that the regulator
had appropriately treated the Expert Commission’s
findings as advisory, and not binding, and that CNEE
had acted legitimately in terms of how it used the
Expert Commission in helping to resolve disputes on
tariff issues.

exercise of its constitutional, legal and
regulatory powers, by which it interpreted its
domestic legislation in a certain way, an
International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal,
constituted under the Treaty, cannot determine
that it has the competence to judge, under
international law, the interpretation made by the
State of its domestic legislation, simply
because the investor does not share this or
considers it arbitrary or in violation of the
Treaty.xvi

In October 2010, TECO, Iberdrola, and other private
investors in EEGSA sold their interest in EEGSA (and
affiliated companies) to another foreign investor for
USD 605 million in cash, plus the purchaser’s
assumption of existing debt.xiv

The tribunal therefore rejected most of Iberdrola’s
claims on jurisdiction. However, the tribunal
determined that one of Iberdrola’s claims fell within the
scope of the treaty – Iberdrola’s arguments that the
administrative and judicial processes and
determinations, individually and collectively, amounted
to a denial of justice under the treaty actionable under
the FET clause.

4. The ISDS Claims
In 2009, while the domestic proceedings were
pending, EEGSA’s investors, TECO and Iberdrola,
each notified Guatemala of their intent to use ISDS
claims to challenge CNEE’s tariff decision. TECO
brought its claim under the US-Dominican RepublicCentral America free trade agreement (US-CAFTADR), and Iberdrola under the bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) between Spain and Guatemala.

The tribunal identified several scenarios that could
support such a claim:
(i) the unjustified refusal of a tribunal to hear a
matter within its competence or any other State
action having the effect of preventing access to
justice; (ii) undue delay in the administration of
justice; and (iii) the decisions or actions of
State bodies that are evidently arbitrary, unfair,
idiosyncratic or delayed. … ‘[D]enial of justice
is not a mere error in interpretation of local law,
but an error that no merely competent judge
could have committed and that shows that a
minimally adequate system of justice has not
been provided.’xvii

Iberdrola v. Guatemala
Iberdrola formally initiated its ISDS claim against
Guatemala on April 17, 2009, while EEGSA’s domestic
legal challenges were still pending. It argued that
Guatemala’s actions violated several of the country’s
obligations under the Spain-Guatemala BIT, including
those arising under the treaty’s provisions on
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET), and
full protection and security.
But according to the Iberdrola tribunal in its August
2012 decision, most of the investor’s complaints simply
did not belong before the ISDS panel. “[B]eyond
labeling the behavior of CNEE as violating the Treaty,”
Iberdrola’s complaints about the regulator’s pricing
decision and the courts’ acceptance of that decision
“did not raise a dispute under the Treaty and
international law, but a technical, financial and legal
discussion on provisions of” Guatemalan law.xv The
tribunal added:

But in Iberdrola’s case, the tribunal concluded, there
was no such denial of justice. Rather, from the
regulatory decisions up through the Constitutional
Court proceedings, Iberdrola simply disagreed with the
domestic process and the outcomes, and wanted the
tribunal to insert itself in the complex domestic dispute
and produce a different result. According to the
tribunal, however, there were no grounds for it to
provide such relief.

It is true, as the Claimant notes, that the legality
of the conduct of a State under its domestic law
does not necessarily lead to the legality of such
conduct under international law. But the fact
remains that if the State acted invoking the

In the end, the tribunal rejected the claimant’s claims in
their entirety, and ordered Iberdrola to pay Guatemala
for the USD 5.3 million it spent defending itself in the
three-year arbitral proceeding. The Iberdrola decision
therefore sent a relatively clear message that
4

investment arbitration tribunals are not places where
disgruntled private investors can go when they
disagree with domestic outcomes on sensitive issues
such as tariff decisions. Rather, something more, such
as a clear denial of justice in domestic proceedings, is
required.

stop at declaratory relief. Rather, the tribunal
effectively overrode CNEE’s decision on the merits,
substituting the regulator’s conclusions on the tariff
formula with the investor’s proposed approach. The
tribunal determined that TECO was entitled to its share
of the difference between the high revenues it would
have received if it had been able to charge its
requested tariffs, and the lower revenues it in fact
received between the time of the tariff decision in
August 2008 and TECO’s sale of the company roughly
two years later. That amount equaled roughly USD 21
million. The tribunal also ordered Guatemala to bear its
own legal costs of roughly USD 5 million, and 75% of
the TECO’s roughly USD 10 million in fees and costs,
adding an additional USD 12.5 million to Guatemala’s
liability.

However, Iberdrola’s bid to annul the arbitral decision
muddied the message. Although Iberdrola’s annulment
application was ultimately unsuccessful, the company
succeeded in getting one of the three annulment
committee members to agree that the Iberdrola
tribunal had too narrowly viewed its powers of review.
The fact that one of the annulment committee
members issued this opinion is particularly significant
given that the scope of review on annulment is
supposed to be exceedingly narrowxviii and applications
for annulment rarely granted.xix Since the annulment
decision was rendered, Iberdrola has re-submitted its
claim against Guatemala in a proceeding under the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules.xx While little information
about the dispute is publicly available, it has been
reported that Iberdrola is trying again to recover
compensation for the same tariff-related measures.

Guatemala challenged that decision in annulment
proceedings, arguing in part that even if there were a
procedural error – a breach of some unwritten
international norm of administrative law – there was no
evidence that the failure to give reasons actually
caused the investor any harm or entitled the investor to
the tariff scheme it had proposed.

Another reason that the lessons from Iberdrola are not
clear is the contradictory outcome in the parallel case,
TECO v. Guatemala.

TECO also sought annulment, arguing that the
damages the tribunal awarded were inadequate.
Among its arguments, TECO asserted that, in addition
to being entitled to the revenue it would have received
under its requested tariff formula, the company should
have been awarded an additional USD 220 million.
TECO alleged that amount represents the difference
between (1) the depressed price at which it sold its
interests in EEGSA, and the (2) price it could have
received if EEGSA had been permitted to charge its
requested higher tariffs.

TECO v. Guatemala
TECO filed its notice of arbitration on October 20,
2010, the day before selling its stake in EEGSA. As
compared to the Iberdrola tribunal, the TECO tribunal
was much more open to the claimant’s claims.
According to the tribunal, the Constitutional Court
decisions did not address CNEE’s alleged failure to
provide satisfactory reasons regarding its tariff
decisions. For the tribunal, the key issue was that the
regulatory body failed to provide reasons regarding its
decision to adopt the tariff study proposed by its
consultant, as opposed to adopting EEGSA’s
proposed formula as amended after input by the
Expert Commission. The tribunal determined that
CNEE had a duty to provide additional reasons for its
tariff decision as a matter of both domestic and
international law, and had violated that obligation.xxi A
failure to give reasons, the tribunal opined, indicated
that the decision taken was arbitrary and lacked due
process.xxii

The annulment committee rejected Guatemala’s
arguments. It did, however, accept several of TECO’s
pleas for partial annulment. The annulment committee
determined that the tribunal had failed to state reasons
for rejecting TECO’s claims that it should be
compensated for having to sell its interest in EEGSA at
price lower than it might have received had the higher
tariff formula been approved. The annulment
committee also annulled the TECO tribunal’s decision
rejecting TECO’s request for pre-sale interest, as well
as the tribunal’s decision to require TECO to bear 25%
of its legal costs. TECO has since resubmitted its case
for damages; that case is currently pending before a
new ISDS tribunal.xxiii

Notably, after the tribunal found fault with the
regulator’s failure to give reasons, the tribunal did not
5

bring their claims in asymmetrical and de-localized
ISDS proceedings irrespective of the complex
governance questions the disputes (and their
outcomes) implicate.

5. What Does This Mean for Stakeholders and
Reform Paths?
The EEGSA disputes are not the only examples of
inconsistent outcomes in investment law, but they are
useful for putting important issues into relief regarding
what we mean by “inconsistency” and for highlighting
opportunities and challenges of potential solutions.
One tariff decision produced two different cases arising
out of the exact same facts and underlying domestic
law. In one, the tribunal said relatively clearly that the
claims put forth by the investor were neither issues
international investment law is meant to solve, nor
questions that respondent states should be asked to
spend resources defending. In the other, the tribunal
determined that international investment law gave it
the power to step in and essentially redo the domestic
regulatory tariff proceedings.

The EEGSA tariff dispute therefore highlights not only
inconsistent outcomes arising of a single investment
project and a single treaty standard (FET), but also
inconsistencies between state and tribunal
understandings of the provisions, and inconsistencies
with other areas of law, including rule of law norms,
and public policy.
Current reform proposals referenced at UNCITRAL
may address a few of these issues but also risk
ignoring and exacerbating the most systemic problems
with ISDS. For instance, in the discussions at
UNCITRAL, there were calls to address the
problematic fact that, as in TECO and Iberdrola,
shareholders could bring parallel claims for the losses
that the company they had invested in allegedly had
suffered. If reforms actually tackle that important issue
of shareholder “reflective loss” claims, then future
ISDS disputes may not produce such clearly
inconsistent outcomes in different cases arising out of
the very same project. But there are still the concerns
that outcomes produced, including decisions by any
future investment court or appellate body, will be
inconsistent with the intent of any particular treaty, or
inconsistent across treaties. And, more fundamentally,
there is the ongoing risk that any decisions issued, or
law generated or solidified by these proposed bodies,
will be inconsistent with domestic or international laws,
rule of law norms, and other public policies, including,
for example, the global commitment to ensure
affordable access to energy for all.

These diverging outcomes have important (if
confusing) implications for foreign investors and
regulators around the world. They also have important
implications for the individuals and entities who use
and depend on essential services provided by the
private sector, and who rely on the government to
ensure services provided by those private entities
meet public needs, including affordability and
accessibility.
For the foreign shareholders, the extra opportunity to
seek a positive outcome through ISDS is no doubt
favorable. In contrast, for the regulators and captive
customers, the investor’s ability to sue, and to do so in
a forum that the citizens and regulator may be hardpressed to follow, much less participate in, is
disconcerting. The TECO tribunal in particular had
viewed the process as unfair to the private investor
because, in the tribunal’s view, the regulator did not
give EEGSA adequate or satisfactory reasons for its
decision. But it is far from clear that the ISDS process
is fair to the citizens, the regulator, or other
government bodies (such as human rights
ombudspersons in Guatemala and elsewhere tasked
with helping ensure access to energy) who have much
less of a practical or legal voice in ISDS proceedings
with so much power over on-the-ground outcomes.

Regarding inconsistency within and across treaties,
one arguable reason for the diverging interpretations is
that the cases were brought under two different
treaties with two intentionally different approaches to
investor protections. In the EEGSA tariff example,
however, if the different standards had played a role in
producing the different outcomes, one would have
expected the TECO case to have been the less
favorable, not the more favorable, decision from the
perspective of the investor. In Iberdrola, the dispute
was brought under the bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
between Spain and Guatemala, which includes a socalled “autonomous” FET obligation. In TECO, the
case was filed under the US-CAFTA-DR, which ties
the FET obligation to the minimum standard of
treatment (MST). Generally, the MST-tethered

Moreover, in Guatemala and beyond, there remain
fundamental concerns and unanswered questions
about whether, when, and under what circumstances it
is appropriate to enable investors to circumvent
domestic substantive and procedural rules for
challenging government measures, and instead to
6

standard such as is included in the US-CAFTA-DR is
considered to be narrower than the “autonomous”
approach such as in the Spain-Guatemala BIT.
Moreover, in the fall of 2012, after the Iberdrola award
in favor of Guatemala had been issued under the
Spain-Guatemala BIT, several non-disputing state
parties to the US-CAFTA-DR – the United States,xxiv El
Salvador,xxv Hondurasxxvi and the Dominican
Republicxxvii – weighed in with submissions to the
TECO tribunal noting the limited role of the FET
obligation under that treaty, and highlighting how
tribunals’ interpretations of that MST-tied standard are
different from, and generally constrained as compared
to, interpretations of “autonomous” provisions. Given
that those non-disputing state party submissions came
after the Iberdrola tribunal had already issued its
decision adopting relatively narrow reading of the FET
clause, the TECO award in December 2013 is even
more surprising for its broader approach to state
liability. It appears that, rather than arising from
differences in the underlying treaties or state views
thereof, the different outcomes in TECO and Iberdrola
reflect the tribunals’ different perspectives regarding
the roles of domestic and international law (and their
associated remedies) in governing foreign investment.

likely be more difficult to shift or depart from than the
current mess of decisions, which are not binding on
subsequent tribunals or on anyone else other than the
relevant disputing parties. Thus, the consequences of
promoting consistency can be severe, as the wrong
type of consistency can be more systemically
damaging than undesirable outcomes that are not
binding on subsequent tribunals. Simply shifting or
consolidating the decision-makers does not inherently
give confidence in their interpretations. Rather, it
raises concerns that, as these bodies of yet uncertain
makeup, rules, power, and accountability shape and
harden the law in a more “consistent” direction, they
may be generating incorrect outcomes as judged from
what states intend and their stakeholders expect from
the system.
Relevant discussions in and around UNCITRAL have
highlighted other approaches for potentially
overcoming the issue of inconsistency with states’
aims and broader objectives. One is to increase the
role of states in shaping the meaning of their treaties
through, for instance, increased unilateral or joint
interpretations on relevant provisions. A second is to
ensure that adjudicators do not have financial,
professional or other incentives to develop investorfriendly approaches irrespective of treaty intent. Here
as well TECO and Iberdrola highlight limits to those
solutions.

How, then, to reduce inconsistency between, on the
one hand, what the states intend and broader societal
objectives warrant and, on the other, what tribunals
decide? Neither proposals for a court nor an appellate
body, alone, will serve either of those objectives. If, out
of the UNCITRAL reform process, countries create a
court and/or appellate body to more clearly send
investment law in one direction or another, what law
will this body or bodies develop? Those bodies may
improve consistency by directing international
investment law to play the role seen by the Iberdrola
tribunal, providing a check against clear unremedied
wrongs and injustices but otherwise taking a
deferential approach to domestic regulatory
approaches. Or, problematically, they may construct
international investment law in the form as envisioned
by the TECO tribunal, and with which the TECO and
Iberdrola annulment committees seemed to
sympathize,xxviii developing and imposing a system of
administrative rules designed to protect the interest of
international capital, noncompliance with which
enables the tribunal to step in, adjudicate a dispute in
a relatively closed forum removed from the local
context, pronounce what the domestic outcome should
have been, and award compensation it deems
appropriate. A key implication of a court and/or
appellate body system is that the law that develops will

First, with respect to the issue of interpretation,
evidence shows that home states in bilateral treaties
are exceedingly unlikely to make submissions to
tribunals on issues of interpretation. Whether this is
because of resource constraints, political reasons, or
other factors, non-disputing state parties to BITs do not
generally weigh in to help tribunals understand treaty
intent when their treaty counterparties are being sued.
This means that the sole inputs on treaty interpretation
by any BIT party are typically the briefs and arguments
by the respondent state, and such respondent state
submissions appear to carry no special weight for
arbitrators.
If the UNCITRAL process ultimately creates a court
and/or appellate body, it is questionable whether home
states will become more active in making such
interpretations, especially if the relevant dispute arises
under a treaty under which the home state is itself
unlikely to be sued. Additionally, as TECO illustrates,
even when non-disputing state parties submit briefs on
interpretation, those briefs may have little practical
effect on actual outcomes.xxix
7

In order to ensure states can exercise effective control
over the interpretation and application of their treaties,
one option would be to ensure that state
interpretations carry more weight with tribunals. This
could be done by ensuring that joint interpretations
issued by the treaty parties are actually binding on
tribunals. But while this may prevent tribunals from
departing from the state parties’ interpretations, it
would not address the many cases in which home
states decline to intervene.

drawn from ICSID’s Panel of Arbitrators, which means
they were either designated by ICSID Contracting
States or by the Chairman of the Administrative
Council.xxxii Of the six annulment committee members,
four (three from TECO and one from Iberdrola) favored
granting the investor the rather exceptional annulment
remedy.xxxiii Of course, having state-appointed
adjudicators (or adjudicators appointed by
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)) should not
mean that states’ voices always or even more
frequently prevail over investors’. But it is nevertheless
important to highlight that, if the aim to ensure treaties
align with state party intent, moving away from partyappointment to state- or IGO-appointments will not
necessarily improve that alignment.

Thus, a crucial reform option is to develop
mechanisms to compel greater home country
engagement in filing or arguing claims. Rather than
continuing to permit home states to allow their
investors essentially unfettered litigation latitude under
the treaty, and legally and politically distance
themselves from the positions those investors take,
one reform approach would be to give home states a
greater responsibility to filter relevant claims. This
could mean adopting a two-step process: sending all
disputes or all claims under particular standards (e.g.,
FET) to state-to-state screening mechanisms before
they are permitted to proceed to international dispute
settlement (which could be ISDS or state-to-state
proceedings).xxx This could also mean simply limiting
allegations of treaty breach to state-to-state dispute
resolution only. Criteria could also be developed at the
domestic level regarding when a state will/will not
pursue a claim on behalf of a relevant investor,
reducing inconsistency, uncertainty and consequences
of purely discretionary decisions.xxxi

Furthermore, a system of state- or IGO-appointment
may not do anything to better align investment treaties
with broader objectives beyond (and potentially
inconsistent with) investor protections. Indeed, a
powerful court and/or appellate body established
specifically to hear concerns of investors, unable to
hear complaints by other citizens or entities (except to
the extent they may be represented by their states’
positions), and structurally isolated from other areas of
domestic and international law and policy and relevant
expertise, exacerbates concerns that any law
developed by a new court or appellate body will be
unduly ignorant of or unconcerned with non-investor
rights and interests.xxxiv
Overall, providing some future set of decision makers
the definitive (and binding) say on the meaning of
investment protection may reduce some types of
inconsistency. But by giving those bodies the
opportunity and power to develop the relevant law,
other stakeholders lose their own voice and power to
shape it. These issues are essential to consider as
ISDS claims can be used to challenge or supplant a
vast range of government conduct, from general
regulation to specific discretionary decisions. Issues
that are extremely sensitive and hotly contested in
domestic legal systems – such as frameworks for
regulating pricing and quality of essential public
services, the powers of corporations to lobby
government actors, and ability of citizens to sue and
seek compensatory or punitive damages for corporate
harms – are issues that may increasingly find their way
into international investment law fora as this field
continues to grow. When desired outcomes under
domestic or other areas of international law are not
ideal for covered investors, those investors can seek
different, i.e., inconsistent, outcomes from investment

Second, regarding the issue of adjudicator incentives,
one critique of the current ISDS system is that the
practice of party appointment creates inappropriate
incentives for adjudicators to hear and favor investor
claims. There have been suggestions that, if the
current system of adjudication by party-appointed
arbitrators is replaced by adjudication by non-partyappointed salaried judges, then the decisions rendered
will more closely align with states’ understandings of
IIAs and be more disciplined. Hence the proposed
reform within the UNCITRAL discussions to create a
standing court, roster and/or appellate body of
individuals to be appointed by states or
intergovernmental institutions.
While proposals regarding adjudicator appointment
may reduce some of the improper incentives driving
arbitral outcomes, TECO and Iberdrola highlight those
reforms’ limits. The annulment committee decisions in
TECO and Iberdrola were rendered by individuals
8

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),xxxvi and that
the current system of ISDS may be having undue
chilling effects on legitimate government policies
adopted in the public interest.xxxvii

treaty tribunals. The question of when investors should
be able to use investment law to trump other
“inconsistent” spheres of law and policy is at the heart
of concerns regarding investment law that have driven
calls for reform. Unless meaningful discipline is placed
on the nature of inconsistencies that can be
challenged, including by limiting or barring direct
investor claims (while maintaining state-to-state
dispute settlement), those concerns about investment
law will not be assuaged. Rather, moving resolution of
these issues to a standing specialized international
investment court or appellate body may only intensify
critiques about the substantive contours of the law.

These interventions echo those made by the UN
Secretary General in July of 2018:
Reform of international investment agreements
(IIA) remains an important area for improving
the sustainable development impact of the
international financial system. While FDI
remains a more stable form of cross-border
financial flow, IIAs often result in unintended
consequences, such as constraining regulatory
space or countries becoming vulnerable to
large financial penalties from arbitration panels
set up to settle investor-state disputes.xxxviii

6. Conclusions Regarding Work on
“Consistency” at UNCITRAL and Beyond
ISDS is much maligned for its inconsistency problems.
As we consider how to fix those problems, we must
have a clear idea of the nature of those problems, and
the advantages and disadvantages of different reform
options. One aspect of the inconsistency issue that
has driven public concern about ISDS relates to
inconsistency of investment law with other areas of law
and policy. As reflected by some delegates’ comments
within the UNCITRAL process, these issues and
concerns must be central in the reform agenda. Some
state delegates to UNCITRAL, for instance, have
emphasized the overarching need to ensure reforms
are pursued in a manner that “promote[s] investment
policies in line with the three pillars of sustainable
development.”xxxv Other state delegates have
highlighted that inconsistency in investment law
threatens to undermine achievement of the

UNCITRAL has a vital role to play in exploring
problems with and potential reform of ISDS, and in
considering how to ensure its work better promotes,
and does not undermine, rule of law, other domestic
and international commitments and policies, and the
globally agreed Agenda 2030. As the process moves
forward, it is therefore essential for the work to take a
broad approach to defining the problem of
“inconsistency” and designing reform solutions.
Reform proposals regarding limiting shareholder
claims, increasing states’ interpretive power, and
avoiding inappropriate adjudicator incentives are
undoubtedly positive signs that reflect earnest desire
for change. But it is unclear that anything short of a
reversion to state-to-state dispute settlement will
minimize the risk of inconsistency across law and
policy spheres.

The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and
the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading
research center and forum dedicated exclusively to
the study, practice and discussion of sustainable
international investment (SII) worldwide. Through
research, advisory projects, multi-stakeholder
dialogue and educational programs, CCSI constructs
and implements an investment framework that
promotes sustainable development, builds trusting
relationships for long-term investments, and is easily
adopted by governments, companies and civil
society.
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